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The English Law Doctrine of Proprietary 
Estoppel and the Extent to which it could be 
applied in Jordanian Law 
 
Dr. Zaid Muhmoud Al-Aqaileh(1) 
 
Abstract 
The English law doctrine of proprietary estoppel is an equitable doctrine 
that represents the intervention of equity to mitigate the strictly harsh rules 
of the statute, and to create new proprietary rights in land, even in the 
absence of any formal requirements. 
In Jordanian law, proprietary rights in land cannot be created 
informally, i.e. in the full absence of the needed formalities, and Jordanian 
courts cannot admit mere promises, or assurances, as a means of creation of 
such rights. 
This article has examined the feasibility of the operation of the doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel, or a similar doctrine, in Jordanian law and 
investigated how Jordanian courts currently deal with such disputes as 
those which are presented before English courts. It has reached the 
conclusion that it is possible for Jordanian law, with certain limit, to adopt a 
similar doctrine under the name of “the doctrine of the fair enforcement of 
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The doctrine of proprietary estoppel is an equitable doctrine that creates and 
affects rights of property. The gist of the doctrine is that where one party (the 
landowner) gives some assurance to another party (the representee), or otherwise 
encourages some belief in the representee, that he has or will have acquired 
some interests in the landowner’s property and the landowner intends that 
assurance to be relied upon, then if the representee does rely on that assurance 
and acts to his detriment, the landowner will not be permitted, afterwards, to act 
inconsistently with that assurance or belief(2). Equity of proprietary estoppel has, 
then, been raised in favour of the representee and it is for the court to determine 
the appropriate remedy to satisfy the equity(3). 
This article discusses the English law doctrine of proprietary estoppel and 
examines the extent to which Jordanian law could benefit from the adoption of 
such a doctrine or equivalent. It is divided into two main parts. Part one provides 
an outline of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and part two considers 
proprietary estoppel categories in case-law and discusses how Jordanian law 
responds to these categories. 
Part One: Outline of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
This part explains the concept of proprietary estoppel and discusses in detail 
its main conditions. 
1.1 The concept of proprietary estoppel 
Under this heading, we will discuss definition of proprietary estoppel, its 
development, its general concern, its general theory, its role, and its conditions. 
1.1.1 Definition 
According to the Halsbury’s Laws of England, estoppel “a disability 
whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a 
fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that 
disability”(4). Therefore, the essence of proprietary estoppel is that the court 
stops someone enforcing a legal right to land because, if he were to exercise his 
                                      
(2)  Thompson M.P, 1981, ‘Proprietary Estoppel’, Solicitors Journal, Vol.125(1), January, pp.539-540; 
Pawlowski M, 1996, The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.22; 
Thompson M.P, 1995, Land Law, First Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.131. 
(3)  Pawlowski M, 1997, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Satisfying the Equity’, The Law Quarterly Review, 
Vol.113, April, p.232. 
(4)  Lord Halisham of St. Maryleborne, 1992, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition-Reissue, 
Vol.16, London, Butterworths, p.951. 
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legal rights, it would be unfair to the plaintiff(5). The doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel has been invoked then to prevent the unconscionable assertion of strict 
legal property rights(6).  
The basic principle of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is that a person 
who makes, by words or conduct, a representation or assurance to another, 
intending that other to rely on it, and the other does so to his detriment, as by 
expenditure of money or giving present accommodation, will not be allowed 
subsequently to take a position inconsistently with the representation which he 
made. In this way, proprietary estoppel acts as a principle of justice to protect 
the second person not the first.  
1.1.2 Development of the doctrine 
The origins of proprietary estoppel can be traced back into the seventeenth 
century where the court found itself face-to-face with a different case in which 
there was no way, in its discretion, unless to affirm the rights of the claimant 
who had relied upon the landowner’s assurance and acted to his detriment(7). 
One of the early cases is Bridges v. Kilburne(8) where a man encouraged 
another to lay out money in the improvement of land and where the court held 
that he would not be allowed to exercise his legal rights against him (the 
claimant). 
Proprietary estoppel cases from the beginning of the nineteenth century are 
still frequently cited(9). However, the speech of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v. 
Dyson(10) is commonly referred to as the basis of the modern law(11). 
In 1989, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (1989) 
(hereinafter LPA) was passed in order to bring more clarity and more certainty 
into the creation and disposition of interests in land. In practice, the majority of 
equitable rights must be evidenced in writing within section 2 LPA 1989. But, in 
exceptional circumstances, equity recognizes the existence of rights arising form 
                                      
(5)   Green K, 1997, Land law, London, Macmillan Press Limited, p.27. 
(6)  Duthie A, 1988, ‘Equitable Estoppel: Unconscionability and the Enforcement of Promises’, The 
Law Quarterly Review, Vol.104, p.362; Thompson M.P, 1981, Op. Cit, p.539; Thompson M.P, 
1995, Op. Cit, p.132. 
(7)   See Hobbs v. Nelson (1649) Nels. 47. 
(8)   Bridges v. Kilburne (Unreported, 1792). 
(9)   See Hunning v. Ferrers (1710) Gilb Ch. 85; Jackson v. Cator (1800) 5 Ves. 688; Taylor v. 
Needham (1810) 2 Taunt 278. 
(10)  Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
(11)  See 2.2.1. 
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oral contracts or promise, providing the conditions of proprietary estoppel are 
fulfilled(12). 
The core element of estoppel dictates that, in a fused system of law and 
equity, legally stipulated entitlements cannot be enforced in total isolation from 
the relational context in relevant dealings that have taken place(13). Fortunately, 
the difficulties flow from an over rigorous reliance on formality are encountered 
in English property law by the doctrine of proprietary estoppel whose 
fundamental purpose is to afford protection against the detriment, which would 
flow from a party’s change of position if the assumption that led to it were 
deserted(14). 
Thus, proprietary estoppel is viewed both as a method of preventing 
unconscionable dealing in relation to land and as a means of creating informal 
proprietary interests in land whenever a party has acted to his detriment in 
reliance upon an oral assurance that he has such an interest in land(15). 
1.1.3 The central concern of proprietary estoppel 
The central concern of proprietary estoppel, as an equitable doctrine, is to 
prevent the person from insisting on his strict legal rights - whether arising under 
a contract, or on his title deeds, or by a statute - when it would be inequitable for 
him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the 
parties(16). 
Proprietary estoppel is a mechanism whereby rights in or over land may be 
created informally and the landowner is not permitted to plead the lack of 
formality in the creation of the defendant’s rights if this would be inequitable. 
Thus, in Commonwealth v. Verwayen(17), the High Court held that “the rationale 
of estoppel is ‘not that it is right and expedient to save persons from the 
consequence of their own mistake, but that it is right and expedient to save them 
from being victimised by other people. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel thus 
counteracts the unconscionable conduct, which involves the insistence upon 
strict legal rights to take advantage of another’s special vulnerability or 
                                      
(12)  See Artis D & Houghton J, 2002, Land Law, London, Blackstone Press Limited, p.14. 
(13)  Gray K, 1993, Elements of Land Law, Second Edition, London, Butterworths, p.312. 
(14)  Pawlowski M, 1997, Op. Cit, p.232. 
(15)   Pawlowski M, 1996, Op. Cit, p.22. 
(16)   See Bailey T, 1983, ‘Estoppel and Registration of Title’, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 
pp.99-106; Baughen S, 1994, ‘Estoppels Over Land and Third Parties’, Legal Studies Journal, 
Vol.14(2), July, pp.147-155. 
(17)  Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR at 394. 
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misadventure. Estoppel has the indirect effect of creating proprietary rights on 
behalf of the claimant who successfully fulfils its conditions”. 
The main concern of proprietary estoppel was expressed by Lord Denning in 
Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v. Twitchings(18) as follows: “estoppel is not a rule 
of evidence. It is not a cause of action. It is a principle of justice and of equity. It 
comes to this: when a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe 
in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it 
would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so”. 
In Willmott v. Barber(19), Fry LJ has expressed this in another way: “a man is 
not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would 
make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights”. This judgement is similar to 
that of Scarman LJ in Crabb v. Arun(20) where he said: “the plaintiff has to 
establish as a fact that the defendant(21), by setting up his right, is taking an 
advantage of him in a way which is unconscionable, inequitable or unjust. The 
court therefore, cannot find an equity established unless it is prepared to go as 
far as to say that it would be unconscionable or unjust to allow the defendants to 
set up their undoubted rights against the claim being made by the plaintiff”. 
1.1.4 The general theory of proprietary estoppel 
Proprietary estoppel is based on the theory that where there is an assurance 
by the landowner, reliance by the claimant on that assurance and acting to his 
detriment as a result of that reliance, then proprietary estoppel arises to protect 
the claimant and to prevent the landowner from insisting on his strict legal rights 
so as to find for himself an escape route to get rid of his undertakings(22). 
Proprietary estoppel arises then to settle, on fair basis, the dispute between the 
parties as will be seen. 
In Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v. Twitchings (above), Lord Denning said: 
“the owner is not to be allowed to go back on what he had led the other to 
                                      
(18)  Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v. Twitchings (1976) Q.B, at 225. 
(19)  Willmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96. 
(20)  Crabb v. Arun District Council (1976) Ch. 179. 
(21)  One can argue here that proprietary estoppel is a principle of justice as well as a rule of evidence. 
This is because according to the judgement of Scarman LJ the burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant by setting up his right, is taking an advantage of him in a way which is 
unconscionable, or unjust. This is an important requirement for the plaintiff’s claim in proprietary 
estoppel to succeed. 
(22)   See Chappelle D, 1995, Land Law, Second Edition, London, Pitman Publishing, p.114; Dixon M, 
1994, Land Law, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, p.37. 
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believe. So much so that his own title to the property, be it land or goods, has 
been held to be limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been 
created therein”. 
The theory of proprietary estoppel is not a creation of the modern law, 
although it is certainly has come into force in recent times. In Willmott v. Barber 
(1880) (above), Fry LJ laid down what was be regarded for many years as the 
five probanda of proprietary estoppel or, in other words, the five conditions that 
needed to be established before a claimant could be awarded a right to another’s 
land arising informally(23). 
The so called five probanda of Willmott v. Barber established a clear 
framework for ascertaining a likelihood of a successful plea of proprietary 
estoppel. However, over a period of time it became clear that courts were 
prepared to accept a plea of proprietary estoppel when one or more of Fry LJ’s 
probanda were missing(24). 
1.1.5 The role of proprietary estoppel in the context of land law 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel plays an effective role in the context of 
English land law. It provides a defence to an action by a landowner who seeks to 
enforce his strict legal rights against someone who has been informally promised 
some right over the land. The landowner is not permitted to plead the lack of 
formality in the creation of the defendant’s rights if this would be inequitable(25). 
Hence, proprietary estoppel plays a much more dramatic role by generating new 
property interests in land in favour of the claimant(26). 
Whatever the general role of estoppel, it is clear that it can have a positive 
effect in the property context. If it were purely a defence, one would expect that 
it would be limited to deny the owner (O) the right to recover possession from 
the claimant (C). Yet, estoppel has been used to enable (C) to claim a right in 
land. At once extreme, the claimant has on occasion been able to force a transfer 
of the fee simple(27) and in other case he has received a lease(28) or an 
                                      
(23)  See 1.1.6. 
(24)  See Berg Homes v. Grey (1980) 253 EG 473, Mathura v. Mathura (1994) The Times 13 May. 
(25)   See Sir Mason A, 1997-98, ‘Equity’s Role in the Twentieth Century’, The King’s College Law 
Journal, Vol.8, pp.1-20; Martin J.E, 1997, Modern Equity, London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp.45-50. 
(26)  Voyce v. Voyce (1991) 26 P & CR 291. 
(27)  Lim Teng Huan v. Ang Swee Chuan (1992) 1 WLR 113. 
(28)  Stiles v. Cowper (1748) 3 Atk 692; J.T Development Ltd v. Quinn (1991) 62 P & CR 33. 
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The significant role of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel stems from the 
fact that it is much stronger than the common law as it can be used to found a 
claim as well as to defend one; it can be used as a sword as well as a shield(30). 
Thus, if an equitable interest cannot be acquired by way of a resulting or 
constructive trust(31), it may be possible on the facts to claim estoppel(32).  
For example, in Baker v. Baker(33), the plaintiff father gave up his secure 
tenancy and moved in with his son and daughter-in-law. The property in which 
they all lived had been purchased by the son and the daughter-in-law with a 
substantial contribution from the father, on the understanding that the father was 
to live there rent free for rest of his life. Shortly, after they all moved in together 
there was a family dispute and the plaintiff father left, moving, eventually, into 
the council accommodation which provided him once again with security of 
tenure, this time rent free as he was granted a housing benefit. The father 
claimed a beneficial interest in his son’s house by way of resulting trust. On the 
fact of the case he failed, but he did succeed by way of proprietary estoppel. 
In such circumstances, the doctrine may operate to prevent the withdrawal of 
an existing facility, which could otherwise be freely withdrawn, or to make 
enforceable a new facility, which could not otherwise be enforced(34). 
                                      
(29)  Crabb v. Arun District Council (above). An easement is a right decided to the benefit of an 
immovable property over another immovable property owned by another owner. A clear example 
of an easement is the right of way (see Mansour M.M, 1997, Property Rights, Fifth Edition, Cairo, 
Dar Al-Falah, p.129; Obaidi A, 2006, Real Property Rights, Amman, Dar Al-Thaqafah for 
Publishing and Distribution, p.92). 
(30)   Baker J.H, 2002, An Introduction to English Legal History, London, Butterworths, p.132; Gravells 
N.P, 1995, Land law: Text and Materials, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.154; Keenan D, 1995, 
English Law, Eleventh Edition, London, Pitman Publishing Limited, p.123; Chappelle D, Op. Cit, 
p.114. 
(31)  Trust as a legal relationship created by a person, the settler, when assets have been placed under the 
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary, or for a specified purpose. In its structure, trust 
is similar to the Islamic law institution of waqf. Each of these institutions is an act of charity; the 
grantor immobilizes his property as an endowment for a charitable purpose to which the income of 
the property is appropriated (see Abraham R, 1998, The Law of Property in Egypt: Islamic Law 
and the Civil Code, New Edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p.20; Coval S, Smith J.C 
and Coval S, 1986, ‘The Foundations of Property and Property Law’, Cambridge Law Journal, 
Vol.45, November, pp.457-475). 
(32)   See Hayton & Marshall, 1996, Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
p.21; Curson L.B, 1993, Equity & Trusts, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, p.63. 
(33)  Baker v. Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408. 
(34)   The Law Commission, 1980, Working Paper No.78: Rights of Access to Neighbouring Land, 
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1.1.6 The conditions which are required for the operation of proprietary 
estoppel 
As said above, proprietary estoppel has, for many decades, played a 
distinguished role in English property law, reflecting the intervention of equity 
to mitigate the consequences of lack of compliance with the formality 
requirements of the common law. The courts have laid down fairly strict 
conditions before an estoppel can be proved. These conditions (generally known 
the five probanda of proprietary estoppel) were codified by Fry LJ in Willmott v. 
Barber (above) as follows: 
(a)-  The claimant of an equity based on estoppel must have made a mistake 
as to his legal rights over some land belonging to another. 
(b)-  The claimant must have spent some money or carried out some action 
on the faith of his mistaken belief. 
(c)-  The true landowner must know of the claimant’s mistaken belief. 
(d)-  The owner of the land over which the rights are claimed must know of 
the existence of his own rights which are inconsistent with the alleged 
rights of the claimant. 
(e)-  The landowner must have encouraged the expenditure by the claimant, 
either directly or by abstaining from enforcing his legal rights. 
The five probanda identified by Fry LJ related quite clearly to ‘unilateral 
mistake’ cases and they were approved in Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v. Zenith 
Investments (Torquay) Ltd(35). However, it has been established that not all the 
probanda have to be satisfied, in particular where there is a representation. 
Oliver J declared in Taylors Fashions Ltd v. Victoria Trustee Co Ltd(36) that the 
probanda should not be seen as strict rules. He stresses that the modern tendency 
is to adapt a much more flexible approach and asks ‘whether, in certain 
circumstances of the case, it was unconscionable for the defendant to seek to 
take advantage of the mistake which, at the material time, everybody shared’. 
Oliver J’s approach has been supported by the Court of Appeal in many cases(37). 
                                                                                                     
London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), pp.11-12. 
(35)  Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v. Zenith Investment (Torquay) Ltd (1971) AC 850. See Royle R, 
1995, Briefcase on Land Law, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, p.91. 
(36)  Taylor Fashions v. Liverpool Victoria Trustee (1981) 1 All ER 879. 
(37)  See for example: Nationwide Anglia BS v. Ahmed & Balakrishnan (1995) 70 P & CR 381; Berg 
Homes v. Grey (above). 
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Gradually, it came to be recognized that the five probanda of Fry LJ did not 
constitute a comprehensive formula and the way was prepared for a broader 
restatement of the principle of estoppel(38).  
1.2 Requirements of proprietary estoppel 
Generally, proprietary estoppel will not arise in favour of the claimant 
against the landowner, unless certain requirements are satisfied. These 
requirements are not rigid, but they are guide-lines for determining whether it 
would be unconscionable for the landowner to rely on his strict legal rights: 
1.2.1 Assurance (representation or expectation) 
In order to establish a plea of proprietary estoppel, the claimant must show 
that there has been a representation given or an expectation created by the fee 
simple owner or his employee or agent(39). It is not sufficient to raise the equity 
that the assurance of entitlement was given by a tenant of the freehold owner(40). 
The party giving the assurance need not be a human; a company acting through 
its employees or agents can give a relevant assurance or representation(41). 
The representation must relate to present or future rights in or over the land 
of the person making the representation. It can be active(42) or passive(43), but in 
either case the person making the representation must intend the claimant to rely 
on it(44). Importantly, the form this assurance or representation takes is irrelevant 
and usually it is given orally or in the context of a written transaction that is not 
itself enforceable(45). The determining factor in this context is the impact which 
the assurance has upon the mind of the claimant as a reasonable person. 
In Lim Teng Huan v. Ang Swee Chaun(46), a written, although unenforceable 
agreement was held to constitute the requisite assurance, and the Privy Council 
held that for proprietary estoppel to exist it was enough if there was an 
assurance, reliance and detriment. 
                                      
(38)   See Halliwell M, 1994, ‘Unconscionability as a Cause of Action’, Legal Studies Journal, 
Vol.14(1), March, p.15; Duthie A, Op. Cit, p.362. 
(39)  Ivory v. Plamer (1975) I C R 340. 
(40)  Ward v. Kirkland (1967) Ch 194 at 241 D. 
(41)  Swallow Securities Ltd v. Isenberg (1985) 274 EG 1028. 
(42)  Plimmer v. Mayor etc of Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas 699. 
(43)  Warnes v. Hedley (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 13 January 1984). 
(44)  J.T Development Ltd v. Quinn (above). 
(45)  Brown M, 2002, Property Law, Surrey, Tolley Publishing Company Limited, p.189. 
(46)  Lim Teng Huan v. Ang Swee Chuan (1992) 1 WLR 113. 
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Assurance may be express(47) or implied(48). It must be clear and 
unequivocal(49). But, in any case, it must be proved that the party giving the 
assurance knew or ought to have known that the claimant was acting in the 
belief that he was acquiring some entitlement on the strength of the assurance(50). 
1.2.1.1 Representation 
The estoppel claimant must show that the representation was given by the 
freehold owner or his employee or agent. The representation must be one of an 
existing fact(51). The courts are reluctant, however, to attach significance to mere 
silence on the part of the landowner unless it is quite clear that he deliberately 
intended that his silence should be construed as endorsing the supported 
entitlement of the estoppel claimant(52). 
In Maharaj (Sheila) v. Chand(53), the woman had been represented by her 
partner, that, if she moved into her partner’s house, he would see that she always 
had a roof over her head. In reliance on his representation, she gave up her 
secure rented accommodation and moved into his house. It was held that an 
equity of proprietary estoppel raised in her favour and her partner’s 
representation amounted to an effective assurance. 
Accordingly, there are two major types of representation:  
(a)- Active representation, which occurs when the landowner, by words or 
conduct, leads the claimant to expect that he enjoys some entitlement in the land. 
Grifflths v. Williams(54) provides a good example here. In this case, the Court of 
Appeal held that there was a sufficient representation where a mother has 
assured her daughter, who was living with her and caring for her, that she would 
be entitled to live in the house for the whole of her life; (b)- Passive 
representation, which occurs when the landowner stands by doing nothing to 
disavow the claimant of a mistaken expectation that he is or will become entitled 
to an interest in the land. The possibility of a passive representation was raised 
by Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v. Dyson (above)(55). 
                                      
(47)  Salvation Army Trustees v. West Yorkshire CC (1981) 41 P & CR 179. 
(48)  Ramsden v. Dyson (above). See Brown M, Op. Cit, pp.173-175. 
(49)  J.T Development Ltd v. Quinn (above). 
(50)  Gross v. French (1976) 238 EG. 39 at 41. 
(51)  Brikom Investment Ltd v. Carr (1979) QB 467. 
(52)  Ramsden v. Dyson (above).  
(53)  Marahaj (Sheila) v. Chand (Jai) (1986) AC 898. 
(54)  Griffiths v. Williams (1977) 248 EG. 947. 
(55)  See 2.3.1. 
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1.2.1.2 Expectation by the claimant 
It is essential that the owner must have some responsibility for what the 
claimant has done. If the owner is ignorant of the claimant’s claim and of the 
detriment, then it may not be unconscionable to deny claimant’s claim. In 
practice, most expectations arise from presentations or assurance by the 
landowner(56).  
In Crabb v. Arun DC (above), the claimant expected that a right of access 
would be allowed, sold off part of the plot, thereby rendering the retained part 
landlocked. The sale constituted the detriment. The owner denied the awareness 
of the specific sale, although there was knowledge of the general intentions of 
the claimant as to the land. Whilst accepting that the problem was not covered 
by authority, the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in holding that the owner’s 
general awareness was sufficient. As Cretney(57) indicated: “equity would arise 
to have the expectations, which had been encouraged, made good”. 
Another example may be found in Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v. 
Council of the City of Penrith DC(58) where the New South of Wales Court of 
Appeal granted compensation to an estoppel claimant which had resurfaced a 
tennis court complex in the ‘reasonable expectation’, albeit unsupported by any 
representation, that it would acquire a long-term lease of the complex. 
1.2.1.3 The nature of the rights promised 
The rights promised must be rights in or over land and must fall within the 
capacity of the owner to grant. Estoppel cannot be found on a representation that 
a planning permission will be available for the development on the claimant’s 
land(59). It, also, cannot operate if the rights promised have already passed to the 
claimant of the equity before he incurs his expenditure or otherwise acts on the 
assurance given to him(60). 
There is no requirement that the representation should be formulated in terms 
of a specific recognized proprietary interest and the courts have shown 
themselves willing, in practice, to invoke the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to 
give effect to expectations of entitlement which vary from a fee simple interest 
                                      
(56)   Duthie A, Op. Cit, p.362; Halliwell M, Op. Cit, p.15. 
(57)  Cretney S.M & Masson J.M, 1997, Principles of Family Law, Sixth Edition, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p.152. 
(58)  Nepean District Tennis Association Inc v. Council City of Pernith DC (1989) NSW ConvR 55-438. 
(59)  Western Fish Products Ltd v. Penwith DC (1981) 2 All ER 204. 
(60)  Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v. Haggie (1979) 2 N Z L R 124. See Brown M, Op. Cit, p.165. 
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in land to the beneficial ownership of a share in land, a right of pre-emption, a 
lease, or an easement(61). 
1.2.2 Reliance 
It is essential for the claimant to show that he has acted in reliance upon the 
representation or expectation that he has or will have acquired new proprietary 
rights in or over the land owned by the party who gave this representation or 
assurance. The claimant must rely on the assurance given to him, in that it must 
be possible to show that he was induced to behave differently because the 
assurance had been given. In practice, this is very difficult to prove, and the 
court may be prepared to infer reliance if that is a plausible explanation of the 
claimant’s conduct. Thus, in Greasley v. Cooke(62), the Court of Appeal held that 
if clear assurance has been made, and detriment has been suffered, it is 
permissible to assume that reliance has occurred. 
1.2.2.1 Presumption of reliance 
It is apparent that there is a presumption of reliance once an assurance on the 
part of the legal owner has been established. The observations of Lord Denning 
in Greasley v. Cook (above) have been judicially interpreted as meaning that 
“where, following assurances made by the other party, the claimant has adopted 
a course of conduct which is prejudicial or otherwise detrimental to her, there is 
a rebuttable presumption that she adopted that course of conduct in reliance on 
that assurance”. 
In Brikom Investment Ltd v. Carr (above), Lord Denning suggests that “there 
is a presumption of reliance once it is shown that a representation was calculated 
to influence the judgement of a reasonable man”. Also, in Wayling v. Jones(63), 
the Court of Appeal held that the burden was on the landowner to prove that the 
claimant did not rely upon the assumption or expectation and he had to establish 
the opposite. 
1.2.2.2 Reliance as the causal link between assurance and detriment 
Reliance provides a vital evidence of the causal link between the 
representation or assurance given by one party (the landowner) and the detriment 
suffered by the other (the claimant). It must be proved that the assurance has 
                                      
(61)  See Hamp v. Bygrave (1983 ) 266 EG. 270 at 726. For more details, see McKenzie T.W, 1998, 
Equity Plays its Role, London, Star House Ltd, p.257.  
(62)  Greasley v. Cooke (1980) 1 WLR 1306. 
(63)  Wayling v. Jones (1993) 69 P & CR 170. 
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induced the expectations of the party to whom it was given or has at least 
influenced his conduct(64).  
It was stated in Wayling v. Jones (above), that there must be a sufficient 
causal link between the promises relied upon by the estoppel claimant and the 
conduct which constitutes the detriment. In other words, the promises or 
representations made must be an effective cause of the detrimental conduct. 
Accordingly, the courts have refused to apply the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel where it was felt that the claimant contributed money and labour, not in 
the belief that she was acquiring either an interest in the family home or a right 
to live there, but merely because she was part of the family. There was no 
evidence of any causal link between the expectation and her change of position 
(arising from her expenditure) in respect of which the equity is claimed(65). 
1.2.2.3 Change of position 
In order to establish a claim of proprietary estoppel there must be a change of 
position by the party who has relied upon the assurance given to him by the 
landowner. In Lloyds Bank v. Rosset(66), Lord Bridge stated that in order to 
generate a constructive trust or proprietary estoppel the claimant “must show 
that she had acted to her detriment or significantly had altered her position in 
reliance on the representation”. Where there is no demonstrable change of 
position, the claim of estoppel, obviously cannot succeed. 
The required change of position itself involves two features: 
(a)- Proof of detriment 
There must be proof of ‘detriment’ by the party who relies on the assurance 
and who seeks to establish a claim in proprietary estoppel. There is no complete 
catalogue of behaviour, which will be regarded as constituting sufficient 
detriment or change of position to establish an estoppel. However, certain types 
of conduct have been recognized as sufficient: 
(i)- Expenditure by the claimant 
The most obvious kind of detriment is that which relates to financial 
expenditure on improvements to realty, provided that the expenditure is incurred 
                                      
(64)  See McKenzie T.W, Op. Cit, p.241.  
(65)  Philip Lowe (Chinese Restaurant) Ltd v. Sau Man Lee (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 9 July 1985). 
(66)  Lloyds Bank Plc v. Rosset (1991) 1 CA 107. 
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in reliance upon the representation. In Pascoe v. Turner(67), the representee was 
held to have acted to her detriment when she spent money improving, repairing 
and decorating the house of her former lover in reliance on his representation 
that she was entitled to an interest in land. Also, proprietary estoppel has been 
recognized where the claimant has built a dwelling-house on another’s land or 
has financed an addition or extension to some existing construction(68). 
(ii)- Claimant improves his land 
If the representee incurs expenditure improving or changing his own land in 
reliance on a representation of entitlement to a representor’s land, this will be 
sufficient detriment. For example, in Rochdale Cananl Co v. King(69), the 
representee built a mill on his land and laid of pipes for the purpose of drawing 
water from the canal which belonged to the canal company. The company 
showed acquiescence and the court held that it was not entitled to an injunction 
to restrain the representee from drawing water. 
(iii)- Representee purchases a new land 
A representee will have acted to his detriment if he purchases a new land on 
the basis of a representation or a promise. Thus, in Salvation Army v. West 
Yorkshire Metropolitan(70), the Salvation Army purchased a new site and built a 
replacement hall when the Council represented that they would be requiring their 
present site for a road widening scheme. They were later informed that the 
scheme would not be adopted for some reasons. The Court of Appeal held that 
the Salvation Army were entitled to an equity and proprietary estoppel would 
interfere to afford protection to them. 
 (iv)- Other types: 
A change of position may comprise other forms of conduct or activity, e.g. 
where the claimant had contributed of physical labour(71), where the claimant 
had given up secure rented accommodation(72), etc. In each case, however, the 
required change of position must be a bona fide change of position(73). 
                                      
(67)  Pascoe v. Turner (1979) 1 WLR 431. 
(68)  Hussey v. Palmer (1972) 1 WLR 1286. 
(69)  Rochdale Canal Co v. King (1853) 16 Beav. 630. 
(70)  Salvation Army Trustees v. West Yorkshire CC (1981) 41 P & CR 179. 
(71)  Dodsworth v. Dodsworth (1973) 228 EG. 1115. 
(72)  Marahaj (Sheila) v. Chand (Jai) (1986) AC 898. 
(73)   Koffman L and Macdonald E, 1995, The Law of Contract, Second Edition, Surrey, Tolley 
Publishing Company Limited, p.504; Artis D & Houghton J, Op. Cit, p.87. 
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(b)- Causal nexus 
The change of position undertaken by the claimant must be referable to his 
reliance upon the assurance given to him. Detriment per se is not sufficient to 
support a claim of proprietary estoppel. It must be shown that the claimant’s 
change of position was referable to his reliance upon what he had been assured 
by the landowner. There must be a causal nexus between the legal owner’s 
assurance or representation and the claimant’s active willingness to undergo 
detriment or sacrifice(74). 
In Bhimji v. Salih(75), Brightman LJ expressed the view that the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel can apply only “where the promisee has in fact acted to his 
detriment in the sense that the promisee has altered his position in a way which 
would be to his disadvantage, if the strict legal position remained unqualified”. 
Mere alteration of a person’s lifestyle may not be regarded. Thus, in Watts v. 
Story(76), the grandson aged 30 years had moved from a settled life in his home 
town in order to live with and look after his elderly grandmother. There was 
some evidence that she had promised him that, in return for his services, her 
house would be his when she died. Although there was a substantial evidence of 
disadvantage suffered by him, the Court of Appeal rejected his claim on the 
basis that an ‘alteration of personal lifestyle is not necessarily a relevant change 
of position in the law of proprietary estoppel’. 
1.2.3 Detriment 
It is essential for the claimant to act to his detriment before proprietary 
estoppel can be made out. The origins of this form of estoppel lie in expenditure 
on the land. Although this remains the most obvious example of detriment, it 
may take quite different forms and certainly need not benefit the landowner(77). 
Several examples may be given from the cases: looking after the landowner or 
members of his family(78), leaving one’s existing home where there is a right to 
remain and also an existing job(79), selling part of one’s land leaving the 
remainder land-locked(80), building a garage on one’s land on the basis of a right 
                                      
(74)  Duthie A, Op. Cit, p.362; Thompson M.P, 1981, Op. Cit, p.539. 
(75)  Bhimji v. Salih (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 1978 B No. 1099, 4 January). 
(76)  Watts v. Story (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 14 July 1983). 
(77)   Riniker U, 1998, ‘The Fiction of Common Intention and Detriment’, The Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer, May-June, p.202. 
(78)  Greasley v. Cooke (above). 
(79)  Jones (A.E) v. Jones (F.W) (1977) 1 XVLR 438. 
(80)  Crabb v. Arun District Council (above). 
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of access(81), buying and building on replacement land in reliance upon the sale 
of land originally owned(82), building a mill on one’s own land in the belief that 
he would be able to take water for it from the landowner’s canal(83). 
The idea of estoppel is simply expressed by Dixon J in Grundt v. Great 
Boulder Pty Gold Mines(84) in terms that ‘the party asserting the estoppel must 
have been induced to act to his detriment’. Dixon J went to say: “the real 
detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which 
would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted that led 
to it. So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who altered his situation 
upon the faith of it cannot complain. His complaint is that when afterwards the 
other party makes different state of affairs the basis of an assertion of right 
against him then, if it is allowed, his original change of position will operate as 
detriment”. 
In proprietary estoppel, it is arguable that the remedy is more closely related 
to the claimant’s detriment than to the landowner’s promise. It can, thus, be said 
that estoppel is doing something quite different from enforcing promise; it is 
remedying the inequity resulting from the landowner encouragement or 
acquiescence in the claimant’s detriment.  
In Inwards v. Baker(85), Danckwerts LJ said: “it seems to me that this is one 
of cases of an equity created by estoppel, or equitable estoppel as it sometimes 
called, by which the person who has made the expenditure is induced by the 
expectation of obtaining protection, and equity protects him so that an injustice 
may not be perpetrated”. 
1.2.4 No bars to the equity 
There must be no bars to the equity and the court may deny a claim based on 
proprietary estoppel in many different situations, these are: 
(a)- Fetter on the statutory discretion or statutory duty of a statutory body 
No public body can be estopped from performing a duty on it by statute or 
from exercising a discretion conferred on it by legislation. Thus, in Western Fish 
Products v. Penwith(86), the Court of Appeal held that an estoppel could not be 
                                      
(81)  E R Ives Investment Ltd v. High (1967) 2 QB 379. 
(82)  Salvation Army Trustees v. West Yorkshire CC (above). 
(83)  Rochdale Canal Co v. King (above). 
(84)  Grundt v. Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641. 
(85)  Inwards v. Baker (1965) 2 QB 929. 
(86)  Western Fish Products Ltd v. Penwith DC (above). 
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raised to prevent a statutory body from exercising its statutory discretion or from 
performing its statutory duty. 
(b)- Unclean hands 
As an equitable doctrine, estoppel requires the claimant coming to equity to 
come with good faith and clean hands. A lack of clean hands may defeat a claim 
to an equity if the original assurance pleaded in aid by the estoppel claimant was 
procured by reason of his own false representations(87). 
(c)- Contravention of statute 
A claim of proprietary estoppel may be refused by the court if it contravenes 
the statute. In Chalmers v. Parode(88), the Privy Council decided that the aid of 
equity could not be lent in support of an estoppel claim based on land 
transaction, which contravened regulatory legislation. 
(d)- Delay by the claimant 
A claim of proprietary estoppel may be barred by excessive delay on the part 
of the claimant in seeking relief. But, the court will not penalize a delay by a 
claimant whose only fault is that he has not taken steps to perfect an imperfect 
gift of title(89). 
(e)- Misconduct of the claimant 
The court is entitled on the facts of every case to look at all circumstances 
and decide what order should be made, if any, to satisfy the equity. In some 
circumstances, subsequent misconduct may be relevant to the court’s response to 
a plea of proprietary estoppel. Thus, in Brynowen Estates Ltd v. Bourne(90), there 
was clear evidence that the estoppel claimant had behaved in a quite 
extraordinary disturbing way by swearing, making obscene gestures at visitors to 
the caravan park and driving at speed late at night around the part of which she 
claimed equity. Based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeal had no 
hesitation in holding that any inchoate equity of estoppel which might have been 
generated by the circumstances of the case had been amply negatived by the 
claimant’s misconduct. 
 
                                      
(87)  Ildebrando de Franco v. Stengold Ltd (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 14 May 1985). 
(88)  Chalmers v. Pardoe (1963) 1 WLR 677 at 685. 
(89)  Voyce v. Voyce (1991) 26 P & CR 291. 
(90)  Brynowen Estates Ltd v. Boume (1981)131 NLJ 1212. 
17
Al-Aqaileh: ???? ??????? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ?? ?? ???? ????? ?? ??????? ????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???????
Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2013
[Dr. Zaid Muhmoud Al-Aqaileh] 
 
 





A claim of proprietary estoppel cannot be established if the claimant is a 
volunteer, and the maxim ‘equity will not assist volunteers’ applies. Thus, a 
claim based on proprietary estoppel was rejected by the Court of Appeal when 
the claimant was merely a volunteer and there was no causal link between the 
detriment suffered and the assurance given(91). 
Part Two: Propriety estoppel categories in case-law 
Law cases present the essential characteristics which embody the notion of 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and each category of cases, in its turn, gives 
an emphasis to one or another of the constituent elements of assurance, reliance 
or detriment. Based on the available cases, proprietary estoppel could be divided 
into four main categories: 
2.1 Imperfect gift cases 
2.1.1 The position under English law 
The general rule is that a gift of an estate, or interest, in land must be 
executed by using the appropriate legal formalities according to section 52 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925(92) which provides “all conveyances of land or of any 
of an interest therein are void for the purpose of conveying or creating a legal 
estate unless made by deed”. In default of such formality, the gift remains 
incomplete, but equity intervenes to perfect it. This means that in the absence of 
such formalities, the gift is normally unenforceable both at law and in equity, but 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may be invoked, in this context, to complete 
an imperfect gift. 
In Dillwyn v. Llewelyn(93), a father allowed his son to build for himself a 
house on a land which he, the father, owned on the understanding that the father 
would convey the title of the land to the son who built a house, spending 
£14.000 with the knowledge and approval of the father. But, no conveyance was 
made and the son claimed to be entitled to have a conveyance of a fee simple. 
The Court of Appeal held that where gratuitous assurance is given that an estate 
or interest in land will be transferred, there arises an equity in favour of the 
promisee based upon proprietary estoppel, provided that the promisee suffers 
detriment in reliance on that assurance. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal upheld 
                                      
(91)  See Watts v. Story (above). 
(92)  The Law of Property Act 1925 became effective as of 1 January 1926. 
(93)  Dillwyn v. Liewelyn (1862) 4 De G F & J 517. 
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the son’s claim and held that he is entitled to have the legal fee simple conveyed 
to him. 
Similarly, in Voyce v. Voyce(94), a mother gave one of her sons a cottage and 
some land as a gift on the condition that he ‘does it up’. This he did, incurring 
some considerable expense in so doing. There was no deed in regard to this gift, 
but several years later the mother executed a deed of a gift in regard to the same 
cottage in favour of her younger son who provided no consideration for the gift. 
Later, the elder son began to build an extension to the property. The younger 
brother claimed that this interfered with the right to his property. The Court of 
Appeal held that as the elder son has spent substantial sums on the cottage in 
reliance upon his mother's promise, she was estopped from denying the gift and, 
as the younger brother could not be in any better position than his mother, the 
elder son was the owner of the property. 
From the above cases one can notice that the court has the ability to interfere 
in order to hold in favour of the promisee and to perfect the imperfect gift even 
in the absence of any required formalities. So, equity has intervened in order to 
do justice between the parties to the case and to give a remedy to the person 
adversely affected. 
It has been argued by Moriarty(95) that the device of proprietary estoppel is 
simply a mechanism by which the law sanctions the informal creation of 
proprietary rights in land. For example, in Voyce v. Voyce (above), it is the lack 
of legal formalities that creates the problem and proprietary estoppel is simply 
used to make up for its absence. 
One can say that this is a logical argument since the main object of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to guide the court to grant remedies to the 
estoppel claimant in order to prevent the unconscionable conduct by the part of 
the landowner. In other words, an unambiguous assurance of entitlement must be 
honoured in light of the subsequent reliance upon it. 
2.1.2 The position under Jordanian law 
In order to explain the Jordanian law expected response to similar estoppel-
type factual problems, as they exist in English law, it is necessary to discuss the 
position in Jordanian law in general, thereafter to investigate how Jordanian law 
                                      
(94)  Voyce v. Voyce (above). 
(95)  Moriarty S, 1984, ‘Licences and Land Law: Legal Principles and Public Polices’, The Law 
Quarterly Review, Vol.100, p.376. 
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deals with such problems, and what types of possible remedies that can be 
granted by Jordanian courts. 
At the beginning, it is noteworthy that Jordanian law does not admit 
promises, representations, or assurances, as a means of the creation of any 
proprietary rights in the representor’s land(96). In other words, Jordanian law 
denies mere promises, which have not been registered in the land register, as 
methods of the creation of any rights in the property, which is owned by the 
legal owner who gives these assurances or promises(97). Therefore, a representee 
cannot plea to the court to obtain an order compelling a representor to fulfil his 
promise, unless the promise is registered in the land register at the land 
registration department whose the land in question lies within its area of 
responsibility(98). Registration in the land records offers the promisee a prima 
facie evidence of his real right(99). It is to be added that such a term as estoppel 
has no exact counterpart in Arabic(100). 
To clarify the situation, however, let us suppose a hypothetical example in 
which a man, Ali, and a woman, Noor, lived together in an established 
relationship according to law. Ali (the husband) is the legal owner of the house. 
He assured Noor (his wife) that the house is hers. In reliance upon Ali’s 
representation, Noor carried out some improvements, decorations and bought 
some furniture. Later, differences between them lead to divorce and Ali sought 
to evict Noor from the house, which is registered in his name. 
What is the solution in Jordanian law? Could Jordanian courts interfere to 
give her a share in the house? 
As mentioned above, Jordanian law does not admit promises as methods of 
the creation of proprietary rights in land. In the above scenario, Jordanian courts 
will not hold in favour of Noor, unless Ali’s promise has been registered in the 
land records at the land registration department whose the property in question 
(the house) lies within its area. 
                                      
(96)  See the Jordanian Court of Cassation Decisions: No.297/80 (1981); No.259/80 (1981); No.813/88 
(1988); and No.142/87 (1989) (Adaleh Publications: www.adaleh.com). 
(97)  Mansour A, 2001, The General Theory of Obligations, First Edition, Amman, Dar Al-Thaqafah for 
Publishing and Distribution, p.84. 
(98)  See section 106 & section 254 of the Jordanian Civil Code No.43 of 1976 (JCC 1976). 
(99)  Siwar M, 2006, Explanation of the Jordanian Civil Law: Original Property Rights, Volume 2, 
Amman, Dar Al-Thaqafah for Publishing and Distribution, p.146; Obaidi A, Op. Cit, pp.160-161.  
(100)  Al-Termanini Abdulsalam, 1982, Comparative Law and Modern Legal Curriculums, Second 
Edition, Kuwait, Kuwait University Press Publications, p.199. 
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What if Ali’s promise has been registered? 
If Ali’s promise has been registered in the land register, the court will, 
certainly, hold in favour of Noor, applying sections 106 & 566 of the Jordanian 
Civil Code No.43 of 1976. Section 566 states “the effectiveness of the contract 
of gift shall be subject to the completion of any procedures prescribed by the 
legislative provisions for the transfer of ownership and either party to the 
contract may complete the necessary procedures; and in respect of movable 
property it shall be completed by taking delivery without any need for 
registration”. Also, section 106 states “if a person promises to make a contract 
and then withdraws and the other person sues him for the fulfilment of the 
promise and if the contract requirements and particularly those relating to form 
are fulfilled, the court’s decisions when it is finally binding shall replace the 
contract”(101). 
What is the solution if Ali’s promise has not been registered in the land 
register? 
If Ali’s promise has not been registered in the land register, Jordanian courts 
will not leave Noor without remedy. In this scenario, the court may grant Noor a 
monetary compensation depending on the amount of money she spent on 
improving the house(102). The court may resort to apply section 256 of the 
Jordanian Civil Code No.43 of 1976 according to which “every injurious act 
shall render the person who commits it liable for damages even if he is a non-
discerning person”. Alternatively, it may resort to apply section 1149 of the 
Code which states “the undertaking to transfer the ownership of an immovable 
property shall be limited to an undertaking for damages if either party commits a 
breach of his undertaking whether the damages are stipulated in the undertaking 
                                      
(101)  In addition, section 20 of the Ownership of Floors and Flats Law No.25 of 1968 and its 
amendments states “notwithstanding the provisions of this Law or of any other legislation, the 
agreement in which two parties pledge to enter into a contract in the future according to which one 
party will sell to another an apartment, a floor, or a building that has not been constructed yet, or 
that is under construction is regarded as a legally binding agreement if it is registered in the land 
register concerned…”. 
(102)  This, of course, is in addition to her rights to seek maintenance for her children for whom she 
keeps the right of incubation (see sections 171-173 of the Personal Status Law No.36 of 2010). It 
should be added that according to sections 72-73 of the Personal Status Law No.36 of 2010, the 
husband is required to make available for his wife a suitable accommodation that contains all 
furniture and facilities necessary for living. This accommodation with its furniture, however, will 
not be subjected to execution in case of the default of payment of debts and the court ruled in 
favour of the creditor (sections 28-29 of the Law of Execution No.25 of 2007). 
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or not”.  
In any case, however, the court will do its best so as to achieve justice to the 
woman. This is because Jordanian law, which finds most of its roots in shari’a, 
looks to a woman as a weak party and seeks to protect her as she cannot bear 
heavy burdens similar to those which a man can do. 
Let us take another example where A is the grandfather and B is the 
grandson. A who is the owner of a piece of land promised B that if B builds on 
A’s land, A would convey the title of the land to B’s name. B did so. Six months 
later, A died without any conveyance having been made. 
What is the legal position of the grandson (B)? 
As Jordanian law does not admit mere promises as a means of the creation of 
any rights in property, the grandson cannot go to the court so as to obtain an 
order compelling his grandfather (during his life), or the executors, to fulfil the 
promise. However, if the son goes to the court and brings an action against the 
executors, the court will do its best to achieve a just solution and to prevent any 
injustice to him. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, the court may 
grant the grandson, a monetary compensation depending on the amount of 
money he incurred.  
The court may resort to apply section 256 of the Jordanian Civil Code No.43 
of 1976 which states “every injurious act shall render the person who commits it 
liable for damages even if he is a non-discerning person”. In addition, since the 
case assumes A’s death after six months, the court may resort to apply sections 
543-547 of the Jordanian Civil Code No.43 of 1976 which are relating to the sale 
in a dying sickness. According to these sections the sale by a sick person of 
some of his property to one of his heirs shall not be effective unless it is 
approved by the other heirs after the testator’s death, whilst the sale to an 
outsider for the quantum merit price or with a slight prejudice shall be effective 
and not dependent on the approval of the heirs. This means that the rules 
governing the will(103) also govern the sale in a dying sickness. Accordingly, the 
property owner (the grandfather in the above example) cannot make a will for a 
successor and cannot make a will that exceeds one-third of the property. 
Are the remedies which may be granted by Jordanian courts adequate? 
In fact, the remedies which may be granted by Jordanian courts in the above 
examples are inadequate; they may result in an injustice to the promisee who has 
                                      
(103)  Section 1125(1) JCC 1976 defines a will as “a disposition of the estate contingent on death”. 
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acted to his detriment in reliance upon assurances or promises given to him by 
the legal owner of the land that he has or will have acquired a proprietary right 
in his land. 
It is noteworthy that the amount of compensation as well as the regular 
maintenance that may be granted by the court to Noor in the first example may 
be of a lesser value than that of a fee simple in land. This, also, applies to the 
second example.  
The shortage of remedies invites for consideration of a new means of 
achieving justice for the promisee who has acted to his detriment in reliance 
upon an assurance or promise, albeit informal, that he has or will have acquired 
a proprietary rights in the landowner’s property. It can be suggested, here, that 
the adoption of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, or its equivalent, will not 
only help to solve many proprietary problems in the Jordanian civil law but also 
it can help to achieve a high level of justice for the promisee. Ultimately, this 
will fill up the gaps and cover the lack of provisions of the Jordanian civil law in 
the concern. 
2.2 Common expectation cases 
2.2.1 The position under English law 
This category of cases concerns the position where A and B have 
consistently dealt with each other in such a way as reasonably to cause A to rely 
on a shared supposition that he would acquire rights of some kind in B’s land. 
Then, it would be unconscionable for B to deny A’s rights in his land(104). 
The classic exposition of the common expectation formulation of the 
proprietary estoppel doctrine is to be found in the speech of Lord Kingsdown in 
Ramsden v. Dyson (above)(105). Here, Lord Kingsdown stated: “if a man, under a 
verbal agreement with a landlord for certain interest in land, or what amounts to 
the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord that 
he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of 
the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the 
knowledge of the landlord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon 
the land, a court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise 
or expectation”. 
 
                                      
(104)  See Halliwell M, Op. Cit, p.15; Duthie A, Op. Cit, p.362. 
(105)  See 1.1.2. 
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The most obvious example of this form of cases is to be found in Plimmer v. 
Mayor etc of Wellington (above). In this case, the appellant, with the permission 
of the Crown, had erected a wharf and later a jetty on the foreshore of 
Wellington (New Zealand) harbour. Part of the harbour, including the land 
occupied by the appellant, became vested by the statute in the provincial 
government; but the appellant continued to use the jetty. The government were 
engaged in the important work of inducing the immigrants into the colony. For 
some reason, they were not prepared to make landing-places of their own. So, 
they applied to John Plimmer to make his landing-place more commodious by a 
substantial extension of his jetty and the erection of a warehouse for baggage. 
The land subsequently vested in the respondent corporation, which took 
possession of the jetty and the warehouse. The appellant claimed statutory 
compensation on the ground that he had ‘an estate or interest in land’. The Privy 
Council decided that the circumstances fell within the principle stated by Lord 
Kingsdown as to expectations created or encouraged by the landowner, and that 
the appellant had an equity arising from the expenditure on land. Accordingly, 
he had acquired a perpetual right to the jetty for the purpose of the original 
licence and this licence became irrevocable. 
The case of Inwards v. Baker (above) provides another example. In this case, 
the younger Mr. Baker wished to build a bungalow for himself on land which he 
hoped to purchase, but the project was beyond his means. His father said ‘why 
not put the bungalow on my land and make the bungalow a little bigger’? The 
son did so, building the bungalow largely through his labour and expense. He 
lived there continuously until his father’s death in 1951, and so from that date 
until the proceedings began. The land was left elsewhere in a will dated 1922, 
and in 1963 the trustees for sale of land brought proceedings for possession. The 
Court of Appeal refused to allow the trustees under the father’s will to obtain 
possession against the son holding that the son had acquired by reason of his 
expenditure on the land an ‘equity’ which bound not only the father (while he 
was alive) but also his successors in title with notice. In giving equitable relief, 
the court took the view that the equity could be satisfied only by holding that 
‘the son can remain there as long as he desires to’. 
From discussion of the cases above, it seems that the common expectation 
engendered by the encouragement of the owner of the land can give rise to an 
equity based on proprietary estoppel. Thus, proprietary estoppel, as an equity-
made doctrine, interferes to give effect to such expectation and to prevent any 
unconscionable conduct by the part of the legal owner of the land. 
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This formulation of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is known as estoppel 
by ‘encouragement’ or estoppel by ‘acquiescence’. The general aim of this form 
of estoppel is to prevent the expectation from being defeated when the other 
party (the representee) had relied upon such a shared assumption or 
expectation(106).    
In this sense, the fundamental target of the court is to do justice between the 
parties and to give suitable remedies as it sees fit according to the facts of the 
case. This was expressed by Lord Denning in Baker’s case(107) as follows: “the 
court will not allow the expectation to be defeated where it would be inequitable 
to do so...it is quite plain that the father allowed the expectation to be created in 
the son’s mind that the bungalow was to be his home”. 
2.2.2 The position under Jordanian law 
As said above, Jordanian civil law does not admit assurances, 
representations, or even any shared assumptions or expectations, as methods of 
the creation of rights of any kind in property. The only way to extract 
recognition of these promises or representations from the court is to register 
them in the land register concerned(108). 
In order to clarify the position in Jordanian law, let us review an example 
from the English case law. An obvious example can be seen in the case of E R 
Ives Investment v. High (above). In this case, A bought the site of a bombed 
building in Norwich and started to build a house on it. At the same time, B 
bought a site adjoining A’s land and started to build a block of flats on it. The 
foundations of B’s flats encroaches beneath A’s land, extending a foot over the 
boundary some feet below ground level. After negotiations, an agreement had 
been reached between them under which B was allowed to retain the foundations 
of his flats on A’s land and A was to have a right of way from his land across the 
yard of B’s flats so as to give him access to a road. Relying on the expectation, 
A built a garage, the only access to it was across B’s land. B raised no objection 
to the building of the garage. Later, when B sold his land to C, the latter sought 
an injunction restraining A from using the yard. The Court of Appeal held that 
by the reason of the acquiescence of C’s predecessors in A’s right under the 
                                      
(106)  See Christine J, 1996, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Future Interests and Future Property’, The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, May-June, p.193; Derham R, 1997, ‘Estoppel by Convention - 
Part I’, The Australian Law Journal, Vol.71(11), November, p.860; Snell E.H, Baker P.U & 
Langan P, 1982, Snell’s Principles of Equity, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.21. 
(107)  Inwards v. Baker (above). 
(108)  See section 106 & section 566 JCC 1976. 
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agreement and the reasonable expectation which was created in A’s mind, A had 
in equity a right of way across the yard. 
Let us consider a similar scenario in Jordanian law: Sarah and Alia are 
neighbours, Sarah assured Alia that Alia could use her land to reach the street 
where Alia used to park her car. Later, Alia sold the land, which contains a 
house, to Nuha and assured her that access to the street, would be granted. In 
reliance upon Alia’s representation and her expectation that she had a right of 
way over Sarah’s land, Nuha built a garage, which the only access to was across 
Sarah’s land and participated in the resurface of the road. When Nuha wanted to 
use the access Sarah refused. Nuha claimed that she had a right of way. 
What is the legal position of Nuha; in other words, what is the solution in the 
Jordanian civil law? 
In a similar scenario as is in Ives Investment’s case, the English Court of 
Appeal, applying the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, held in favour of the 
represntee. But, the solution in Jordanian law is different as it does not admit 
mere representations, or assurances, as methods of the creation of proprietary 
rights in land. Therefore, the Jordanian court will reject Nuha’s claim or it will 
not hold in her favour. 
Are there any possible remedies? 
If Alia used Sarah’s land in order to reach the street for a period of fifteen 
years or more, and Sarah acquiesced, then Alia will acquire a right of way by 
prescription according to sections 1181 & 1289 of the Jordanian Civil Code 
No.43 of 1976 providing Alia’s use was continuous. However, if the Alia’s land 
is land-locked then the court may grant her (Alia) a short cut. This, of course, is 
subject to a fair compensation to be paid to Sarah(109). 
In the above scenarios, the court may grant Alia a right of way, whether 
perpetual or temporary, as a result of the nature of her land, i.e. because her land 
is land-locked, or as a result that this right is being practised for more than 
fifteen years. In other words, the right of way, which may be granted to Alia, is 
granted not because of the shared supposition that Alia would acquire a right of 
way in Sarah’s land but because Alia has acquired this right by the elapse of 
time (prescription) or because Alia’s land is land-locked and she has paid in 
return for the access to the public road. 
 
                                      
(109)  The court’s decision will be based on section 1290(1) JCC 1976. 
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This means that even if the Jordanian court grants Alia a right of way, this 
right may be subjected to a monetary payment to Sarah and this subsequently 
may impose financial burdens on Alia. This shows that the court’s decision may 
not achieve the required level of justice to Alia, which might be achieved if the 
case were to be presented before any English court. 
Accordingly, it can be said that proprietary estoppel, or an equivalent 
doctrine, may help to achieve justice for the representee who has relied upon an 
informal promise, or representation, or who has acted to his detriment in reliance 
upon the common assumption or expectation that he has or will have acquired 
any proprietary rights in the landowner’s property.  
2.3 Unilateral mistake cases 
2.3.1 The position under English law 
This category of case-law applies in circumstances where only one party has 
made an error about his rights. The primary importance is attached to the 
detriment, which is suffered by a party who innocently relies on his mistaken 
belief that he has rights in land(110). 
The basis of this type of case was explained by Lord Cranworth in Ramsden 
v. Dyson (above) in which the tenant under a tenancy at will had built upon the 
land in the belief that he would be entitled to demand a long lease. The majority 
in the House of Lords held that he would not. Lord Cranworth dissented on the 
facts and expressed his point of view as follows: “if a stranger begins to build in 
my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from 
setting him right, and I leave him to persevere in his error, a court of equity will 
not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land on which he had spent 
money on the supposition that the land was his own. It considers that, when I 
saw that mistake into which he had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to 
state my adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me to remain wilfully 
passive on such occasion, in order afterwards to profit by the mistake which I 
might have prevented”. 
One can say, here, that Lord Cranworth’s approach is better than the 
approach of the majority of the Lords and what supports our argument is the 
frequent resort to this approach. An example is the case of Crabb v. Arun 
District Council (above), where the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in holding 
that the landowner’s general awareness was sufficient.  
                                      
(110)  See Riniker U, Op. Cit, pp.202-209. 
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In Willmott v. Barber (above), Fry LJ formulated his own definition of the 
notion of estoppel. In his view, a man is not to be deprived of his strict legal 
rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to 
set up those rights. In fact, the five probanda laid down by Fry LJ are related 
quite clearly and exclusively to unilateral mistake cases(111). 
It is appeared from the above cases that in a unilateral mistake category of 
cases, the landowner (O) must have some responsibility for what the claimant 
(C) has done. Thus, if the landowner is ignorant of the claimant’s claim or of the 
detriment, then it will not be unconscionable for him to deny C’s claim. As 
Nourse LJ observed in Barclays Bank Plc v. Zaroovabli(112): “you cannot 
encourage a belief of which you do not have any knowledge”. 
2.3.2 The position under Jordanian law 
Jordanian courts have no discretion to hold that the acquiescence or the 
general awareness of the landowner is sufficient to create proprietary rights in 
favour of the third party, who has made a mistake concerning his rights and his 
true legal position. 
In order to clarify this situation clearly, let us consider a hypothetical 
example. Suppose that Ali is the landowner who, by his conduct, leads another 
party (Zaid) to believe that he is not the landowner, or that Zaid can safely spend 
money on it. Zaid does so, in the belief that the land will be his own, or that he 
will acquire an interest in it. Later, Ali claims that Zaid has no claim to his land 
and seeks to assert his legal title, so as to deprive Zaid of the benefit of his 
expenditure on the land. 
The solution in the Jordanian civil law: 
At the outset, it is appropriate to indicate that in English law, the gist of this 
issue is to be found in the speech of Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v. Dyson 
(above) where he stated: “it would be dishonest in me to remain wilfully passive 
on such an occasion, in order afterwards to profit by the mistake which I might 
have prevented”. Thus, it seems to be that in the above scenario, the English 
court will certainly hold that the landowner, Ali, is not permitted to assert his 
title so as to deprive the plaintiff, Zaid, of the benefit of his expenditure. 
As for the position in Jordanian law, it is of great importance to refer to 
section 1081 JCC 1976, which states “whosoever reclaims or resurrects derelict 
                                      
(111)  See 1.1.6. 
(112)  Barclays Bank Plc v. Zaroovabli (1997) Ch 321 at 330. 
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land by permission from the competent authority shall be its owner”. This is 
because the law considers any land of which there is no owner, as a property that 
belongs to the state(113). 
But, where the land belongs to another person, Ali, as is in the above 
example, the other party (Zaid), will not acquire any proprietary rights if Ali 
shows some forbearance towards the intrusion of Zaid(114). The burden is on the 
plaintiff (Zaid), to prove that Ali did not show any forbearance. However, if 
Zaid does prove this in a court, the court may grant him any proprietary right, as 
it sees fit in the circumstances of the case, such as a fee simple, a right of way 
(an easement), etc. This is providing that he satisfies the conditions laid down by 
section 1181 JCC 1976, concerning the acquisition of proprietary rights by 
prescription. But, if Zaid fails to prove this, it seems likely that the court will 
reject his claim and leave him with no remedy. In other words, the court’s 
decision will depend on the conditions which are satisfied by Zaid concerning 
the acquisition of proprietary rights by prescription according to section 1181 
JCC 1976. Thus, if the plaintiff (Zaid) fails to satisfy these conditions, the courts 
will not uphold his claim.  
It seems necessary to indicate that the court, in any case, will strive to 
prevent any injustice to the plaintiff. But, the court cannot overlook or 
circumvent the provisions of the statute to which its discretion is limited. The 
court, however, may resort to apply sections 293 & 294(1) JCC 1976 which are 
concerned with unjust enrichment if the required conditions are met(115).  
Alternatively, the court may take into consideration any surrounding 
circumstances, in order to determine the best solution to the dispute in question 
and to achieve justice for both parties. This narrow discretion of the court will 
not in any way amount to the equity that may be raised by the operation of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel if it is to be adopted in the context of the 
Jordanian land law. 
Accordingly, one can say that the remedies, which may be granted by 
Jordanian courts, in the above example, are inadequate. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that the adoption of this doctrine, or its equivalent, will remedy the 
                                      
(113)  See section 1080(1) JCC 1976. 
(114)  See section 1171(3) JCC 1976. 
(115)  Section 293 JCC 1976 states “no person shall take the property of another without a lawful cause, 
and if he takes it he shall return it”. Section 294(1) JCC 1976 states “whoever gains the property of 
another without a gainful disposition shall pay its value to that other unless the law otherwise 
provides”. (See Mansour A, Op. Cit, pp.263-268). 
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defect in the provisions of the law and guarantee a higher level of justice for 
litigants. 
2.4 Co-ownership cases 
2.4.1 The position under English law 
Co-ownership of land exists where two or more persons enjoy property, or an 
interest in it, at the same time. In the huge majority of cases they simultaneously 
share the fee simple absolute in possession. Much of the case law has arisen in 
the context of matrimonial home, or more importantly, in the context of various 
forms of cohabitation. However, for unmarried couples, disputes concerning 
their home have to be decided upon general law principles, especially those 
relating to trusts(116). 
English law recognizes more than one form of co-ownership. The two forms 
which have survived to the present day are the joint tenancy and the tenancy in 
common. The principle distinguishing feature of the joint tenancy is the right of 
survivorship, i.e. when one of the joint tenants dies, the person’s share does not 
pass under a will or intestacy. Instead, the surviving joint tenants are entitled to 
the property. It follows that the joint tenant who outlives all the others will 
become the sole owner of the property(117). 
The tenancy in common provides a more flexible form of co-ownership. 
There is no right of survivorship and the shares can be of whatever size the 
parties desire. It should be noted, here, that a joint tenancy can be converted into 
a tenancy in common. 
For more clarification, it is necessary to discuss two forms: the position of 
married couples and the position of unmarried couples: 
(i)- Married couples 
A spouse with no property interest (or merely an equitable interest) is given a 
statutory right to retain occupation or, with the leave of the court, to go into 
occupation(118). No equivalent right is given outside marriage. 
 
                                      
(116)  Bum E.H, 1996, Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials, Fifth Edition, London, Butterworths, 
p.57; Ferris G and Battersby G, 1998, ‘The Impact of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of the 
Trustees Act 1996 on Purchasers of Registered land’, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 
May-June, p.168. 
(117)  See Brown M, Op. Cit, pp.243-245. 
(118)  Section 30 of the English Family Law Act 1996. 
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For all cohabitants, spouse and associated persons, the court has power to 
vary rights of occupation where both parties possess a right to occupy, whether 
based on property right or special spouses’ right to occupy. In essence, when a 
relationship breaks down, the court can order that either party should occupy the 
property and that the other should leave(119). 
(ii)- Unmarried couples (cohabitants) 
Where the two parties A and B live together and have a sexual relationship, 
but are not married and the woman, A, has made a contribution to the purchase 
price of the house, the contribution is likely to be treated as giving her a 
proportionate share in the house. But, where there is no contribution to the 
purchase price and where there is sufficient evidence of an original common 
intention that the property should be shared equally, a constructive trust(120) that 
gives the woman, A, an equal share in the property will arise in her favour(121). 
In Hammond v. Mitchell(122), a man, H, and woman, M, lived together in a 
bungalow, which was conveyed, to the name of the man alone. M supported H in 
the finance of a loan from the bank. When the relationship broke down, M 
claimed a beneficial interest in the bungalow. The court held that there had been 
a common intention that the beneficial ownership of the property should be 
shared.  
The above discussion reveals that English courts may grant remedies to the 
parties who have relied upon promises given to them by their partners or 
cohabitants even if they live together outside marriage. Thus, in Pascoe v. 
Turner (above), A and B lived together in a house purchased by A. After several 
years A ended the relationship and moved out of the house. On number of 
occasions A told B the house and its contents were hers, but he never conveyed 
                                      
(119)  See Hayton D, 1990, ‘Equitable Rights of Cohabitees’, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 
pp.370-387. 
(120)  The concept of a constructive trust becomes involved in the case where there is clear evidence of 
an actual agreement between the parties as to the beneficial ownership of the home. The role of the 
constructive trust, in this context, is to prevent a statute from being used as an instrument of fraud 
in that section 53(l)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 requires a declaration of trust concerning 
land to be evidenced in writing. The lack of such writing will make the declaration of trust 
unenforceable. To prevent this, a constructive trust, which is exempt from the statutory 
requirements of writing, is imposed to enforce the oral agreement between the parties. (See Ferris 
G and Battersby, Op. Cit, p.168; Hayton & Marshall, Op. Cit, pp.21-22; Curson L.B, Op. Cit, 
p.63). 
(121)  Martin J.E, Op. Cit, p.323. 
(122)  Hammond v. Mitchell (1992) 2 All ER 109, (1991) 1 WLR 1127. 
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the property to her. In reliance upon A’s assurance and with knowledge of him, 
B spent her own money on repairs, redecoration, improvements and also on 
buying of furniture. Later, A sought to evict her and gave her a notice to 
determine the licence. The Court of Appeal held that an equity of proprietary 
estoppel raised in her favour and compelled him to convey the house to her 
name. This indicates that English courts may give a remedy to the spouse or the 
cohabitant who has incurred expenses or whatsoever if there is a common 
intention that the ownership of the property shall be shared. Whether the parties 
are married or unmarried is a matter that has no influence on the court’s 
decision. 
Now, the question is: if a similar case is to be presented before Jordanian 
courts, could Jordanian law help B? 
2.4.2 The position under Jordanian law 
At the beginning, it is noteworthy that Jordanian courts have no power to 
order beneficial interests in the property or to enforce oral agreements, or 
promises upon which one of the parties has relied. 
In Jordanian law, concurrent interest exists where two or more people enjoy 
a property, or an interest in it simultaneously. Jordanian law does not recognize 
more that one form of co-ownership that is the tenancy in common. It does not 
admit of any other forms of co-ownership such as the joint tenancy form. It 
follows that when one of the persons who shares the ownership of the property 
dies, his share passes under a will or intestacy and it does not transfer to the 
other party who is still alive(123). In other words, there is no right of survivorship 
in Jordanian law. In addition, the shares of the parties can be of whatever size 
they wish them to be(124). 
For better understanding, let us suppose that A and B equally hold a 
blackacre in a fee simple. They are then both entitled to occupy the land. If the 
land is let, they are each entitled to a half share of the rent; if it sold they are 
each entitled to a half share of the proceeds of sale. So far no problem arises. 
But, what happens when one of them, say A, dies? What happens to his half 
share in the land? 
In fact, one solution is possible in English law. That is when A dies, he 
ceases to have any interest in the land. Therefore, his half share will be left to B 
                                      
(123)  Siwar M, Op. Cit, p.62.  
(124)  See Korkobi M & Mansour S, 2002, Real Property Rights, Beirut, Sader Publications, p.365. 
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and B becomes the sole owner of the Blackacre. But, in Jordanian law A’s share 
will not in anyway be transferred to B, and according to the Jordanian Personal 
Status Law No.36 of 2010 it will pass to his heirs, taking into account the terms 
of his written will(125). 
On the other hand, Jordanian law denies any relationship between a man and 
a woman outside marriage. It also penalizes any sexual relationship that may 
exist in infringement of the rules of law. The same applies to homosexual or 
lesbian relationships(126). 
For further explanation, it is appropriate to consider two situations; namely: 
unmarried couples and married couples: 
(i)- Unmarried couples 
Jordanian law, which derives most of its rules from shari’a, does not admit of 
any relationship between a man and a woman outside marriage. It also penalizes 
the parties to such a relationship. In the Holy Quran, the sentence for this type of 
relationship is flogging hundred times(127). But the Jordanian Penal Code No.16 
of 1960, which is mainly derived form European laws, particularly French law, 
does not apply this rule(128). It provides that the penalty is imprisonment from 
one year to three years for each of the parties(129).  
In the English case of Pascoe v. Turner (above), the woman had been 
represented by her partner, that, if she spent her own money on repairs, 
redecoration and improvements, he would convey the house and its contents to 
her name. The Court of Appeal held that an equity of proprietary estoppel raised 
in her favour and compelled him to fulfil his promise towards the promisee. 
This shows that the English Court of Appeal applying the equity which had 
been raised by proprietary estoppel, protected the woman against the man, who 
had assured her that the house and its contents would be hers and compelled him 
to convey the fee simple to her name. But, if a similar case is to be presented 
                                      
(125)  See sections 254-268 & section 310 of the Personal Status Law No.36 of 2010. 
(126)  See sections 282-286 of the Jordanian Penal Code No.16 of 1960 and its amendments. 
(127)  In the Holy Quran, Allah, the Almighty, has said “the woman and the man guilty of adultery or 
fornication - flog each of them with a hundred stripes: let no compassion move you in their case, in 
a matter prescribed by Allah, if you believe in Allah and the Last Day: and let a party of the 
believers witness their punishment” (Holy Quran, Surat Al-Nur, verse 2). See Abdullah Y.A, 2000, 
The English Translated Holy Quran, Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions Limited, p.87.  
(128)  See Amin S.H, 1984, Islamic Law, Glasgow, Royston Ltd, p.260. 
(129)  Section 282(1) of the Code. 
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before a Jordanian court, would the court protect the woman? It seems that the 
Jordanian court will protect her only if she is in a legal relationship according to 
the provisions of the law. In any other circumstances, the court will certainly 
reject her claim and leave her with no remedy. This means that such a case as 
Pascoe v. Turner will not find a similar application if it is to be presented before 
any Jordanian court, and the court will not grant the woman any rights of any 
kind in the property because of the illegal relationship that connects her with the 
man. 
(ii)- Married couples 
Jordanian law only recognizes sexual relationships, which are based on 
marriage according to the provisions of law. The reason for this is to protect the 
society at large from immoral conducts, diseases, poverty, social problems, etc. 
Jordanian law provisions aim to protect the woman in a legal relationship, and 
seek to cover her with the needed protection as she cannot bear heavy burdens 
similar to those which a man can do. 
To consider this situation in detail, let us suppose that a man, A, and woman, 
B, lived together and had a sexual relationship without being married. A 
promised B to give her the fee simple in his house. In reliance upon this promise, 
she gave up her own flat, moved into his house and spent some money on 
improving, painting and furnishing of the house. When their relationship broke 
down, he sought to evict her, claiming that she had only a licence and that a 
notice had been served on her. 
What is the possible solution in Jordanian law? 
In this hypothetical example, there is no doubt that the Jordanian court would 
reject the woman’s claim for want of legality. Moreover, the Jordanian court 
enjoys no discretion concerning the order of beneficial interests in land in the 
form of an English law constructive trust. However, in a similar case, the 
English Court of Appeal had upheld the woman’s claim and ruled that the equity 
of proprietary estoppel had been raised in her favour. 
But, let us suppose that A and B are a husband and a wife; in other words, 
they are married couples. In this case, the court may apply the provisions of the 
law of restitution (unjust enrichment)(130), and rule in the woman’s favour by 
granting her the suitable remedy as it sees fit according to the facts and 
                                      
(130)  See Mansour A, Op. Cit, pp.263-268. 
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circumstances of the case(131). In any case, however, the Jordanian court will not 
admit of such remedies as those recognized by English courts, i.e. proprietary 
estopple and constructive trust.  
Evaluation & conclusion 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel operates as a means by which a person 
may acquire an interest in land belonging to another and the court may award 
this interest as a remedy against the landowner who has conducted himself in 
such a way that it would be unjust for him to deny the promisee any entitlement, 
because it has not been appropriately created. More precisely, protection of the 
claimant is the main target of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
As an equitable doctrine, proprietary estoppel plays an effective role in the 
context of English land law. It can be used to found a claim, as well as to defend 
one. Thus, it can be regarded as a mechanism by which the law sanctions the 
informal creation of proprietary rights in property. 
The above discussion revealed that Jordanian law rules are different from 
those of English law in respect of the creation of proprietary rights in land. 
However, it is found that it is possible for a similar doctrine to be applied in the 
context of Jordanian land. Once the Jordanian legislator accepts the idea of 
proprietary estoppel, there is nothing prevents it from adopting a similar doctrine 
under the name of ‘the doctrine of the fair enforcement of representations or 
promises in land’. Application of this new doctrine to factual cases, however, 
may encounter hardships due to the nature of the Jordanian legal system. Thus, 
this new doctrine may be applied, at a first stage, to some situations: 
(a)- Imperfect gift cases 
As mentioned above, this kind of cases can be seen where one party (the 
landowner) promises another party (the promisee) that the other party has or will 
have acquired a fee simple in the property and the promisee has acted to his 
detriment in reliance upon that promise. In English law, the court has the power 
to interfere in order to compel the landowner to fulfil his promise towards the 
                                      
(131)  The relevant sections in this concern are sections 293 & 294(1) JCC 1976 (see 2.3.2). Four main 
elements should be available in order to support the woman’s claim in unjust enrichment: i- 
enrichment by the man, be it direct or indirect, material or immaterial, i.e. the woman must have 
provided the man with something of value while expecting compensation in return; ii- loss by the 
woman, be it direct or indirect, positive or negative; iii- a connection between enrichment and loss; 
and iv- absence of a justification for the enrichment, i.e. non existence of a legal cause, whether it 
is derived from law or from contract. 
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promisee. But Jordanian courts currently refuse to intervene in this situation in 
the full absence of the required formalities (s.106 & s.566(2) JCC 1976). It can 
be argued here that the position of Jordanian law, in this respect, is defective and 
it may cause injustice to the promisee who has acted to his detriment in reliance 
upon the other party’s promise. It can be suggested, then, that application of this 
new doctrine will help to remedy the defective provisions of the civil law and to 
achieve justice to the promisee despite the absence of any required formalities.  
(b)- Common expectation cases 
This kind of cases concerns the situation where two parties, A and B, 
consistently dealt with each other in such a way as reasonably to cause A to rely 
on a mutual assumption that he could acquire proprietary rights in B’s land. The 
general aim of the new doctrine, if it is to be adopted, is to prevent the 
expectation from being defeated when the other party, A, has relied upon such a 
shared assumption or expectation. In English law, the court can intervene so as 
to achieve justice between the parties and to provide a suitable remedy 
depending on the facts of the case, whilst Jordanian courts have no power to 
intervene in the absence of the needed formalities.  
(c)- Unilateral mistake cases 
This kind of cases concerns the situation where only one party, A, has made 
a mistake in respect of his rights. The most important element in this context is 
the element of detriment which is suffered by the party who has relied upon his 
mistaken belief that he has or will have acquired rights in another party’s land. 
In many cases of this kind, the English courts, with no hesitation, held that 
where the landowner, by his conduct, leads another party to believe that he is not 
the owner or that the other party can safely spend money on the property, he 
cannot afterwards assert his title so as to prevent the other from taking benefit of 
his expenditure.  
As for Jordanian courts, it is found that Jordanian courts have no discretion 
to take into account the element of detriment in their judgements, so as to grant 
the claimant a suitable remedy that satisfies the circumstances of his case. 
Furthermore, the claimant cannot go to the Jordanian court to obtain an order 
compelling the landowner to grant him any proprietary rights in his land, as a 
compensation for the detriment suffered by him, as a result of his reliance on his 
mistaken belief. Therefore, it can be suggested that the application of this new 
doctrine in these types of cases will guarantee a higher level of justice to the 
claimant. 
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This new doctrine, however, may not apply to the co-ownership type of 
cases. This is because Jordanian law, which derives most of its rules from 
shari’a, does not recognize any relationship between a man and a woman outside 
marriage. Furthermore, if any of the parties to the marriage relationship dies, his 
or her share will not pass to the other, but it will transfer to his or her all heirs 
according to shari’a rules. 
Based on the rules of the doctrine of unjust enrichment, however, the 
Jordanian court may hold that the party who gains any benefit, as a result of the 
other person’s contribution, is liable to repay it or its equivalent value. 
In short, this new doctrine is applicable to a wide range of situations, such as 
those mentioned above. But, it is inapplicable to a narrow range of situations in 
which it may function contrary to the rules of shari’a. The main object of this 
new doctrine is to remedy the defective provisions of the civil law and to 
guarantee a higher level of justice to the representee or promisee . 
It is to be mentioned, here, that even though this doctrine is an equity-made 
doctrine, or a doctrine that stems from the rules of equity, which is originally 
found in the English common law, it can operate in the Jordanian civil law of 
which the rules of justice are regarded as a complementary source (s.2(3) JCC 
1976). These rules conform to the rules of equity in English law. In addition, 
there is nothing which prevents the Jordanian legislator from adopting such a 
doctrine as long as it does not contravene the rules of shari’a or the rules of 
public order. 
It should be added that Jordanian courts focus on principles rather than on 
facts. They use facts only to the limit required to support or serve the principle. 
On the other hand, English courts focus on facts and use such facts to underpin 
the principle and to create a new judicial precedent, or state a precedent that 
conforms to a previous one. However, since the facts are necessary to clarify the 
case in question, it is recommended that Jordanian courts should follow the steps 
of the English courts, by focusing on the facts of the case in question, and giving 
detailed as well as fully-reasoned verdicts. This, of course, will not undermine 
their role or make them ignore the rules of law, but instead it will support the 
principle at issue, on the one hand, and remove vagueness and achieve more 
justice, on the other. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, 
however, should not affect the principle at issue. More precisely, the facts and 
circumstances of the case should be taken into account only when deciding the 
amount of compensation which the claimant deserves. 
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Concerning the possible remedies which may be granted by Jordanian courts 
one can say that the discretion of Jordanian courts is limited to the provisions of 
the statute. However, they may take into account the surrounding circumstances 
in each case. Accordingly, Jordanian courts can grant any possible remedies, 
such as a right of way (an easement), a lease, or even a monetary compensation. 
But, it seems to be that such remedies as the transfer of a fee simple in land, or 
the grant of a share in land to one of the parties who shares a relationship with 
the other outside marriage, are outside the range of the possible remedies which 
may be granted by Jordanian courts. Thus, such a case as Pascoe v. Turner may 
not find a similar application in the Jordanian courts, if such a doctrine, or its 
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نظام إلزامية الوعد الشفوي بنقل ملكية 
عقار أو حق عيين عقاري يف القانون 
نية تطبيقه يف اإلجنليزي ومدى إمكا
  القانون األردين
  الدكتور/ زيد حممد العقايلة
  :الملخص
إنَّ نظام إلزامية الوعد الشفوي بنقل ملكية عقار أو حق عيني عقاري في القانون اإلنجليزي 
هو نظام أنشأته قواعد العدالة المطلقة (قواعد اإلنصاف) وهو يمثل تدخل العدالة من أجل 
إقرار حقوق ملكية عقارية حتى في حالة من أجل قانون المكتوب و التخفيف من جمود قواعد ال
غياب أية إجراءات شكلية. أما في القانوِن األردني فإنه ال يمكن إنشاء حقوق ملكية عقارية في 
حالة غياب الشكلية المطلوبة، كما أن المحاكم األردنية ال تعترف بالوعود المجردة أو التأكيدات 
يناقش هذا البحث مدى إمكانية تطبيق هذا النظام أو  .ء مثل هذه الحقوقالشفوية كوسيلة إلنشا
أي نظام مماثل في القانون األردني ويبحث في كيفية تعامل المحاكم األردنية حاليًا مع قضايا 
 - ، وقد خلص البحث إلى أنه من الممكن عرضت أمام المحاكم اإلنجليزيةالتي  مشابهة لتلك
نظام أو مبدأ  مثل هذا النظام في القانون األردني تحت اسم تطبيق - وضمن نطاق معين 
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